Revenue-constrained strategic trade and industrial policy by Leahy, Dermot
www.elsevier.com/locate/econbase
Economics Letters 82 (2004) 409–414Revenue-constrained strategic trade and industrial policy
J. Peter Neary*, Dermot Leahy
Department of Economics, University College Dublin, Balfield, Dublin 4, Ireland and CEPR, London, UK
Received 13 June 2003; accepted 16 September 2003Abstract
We characterise optimal revenue-constrained trade and industrial policy towards dynamic oligopolies, prove
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1. Introduction
The theory of strategic trade policy highlights differences in commitment ability between firms and
governments as a key motivation for intervention in oligopolistic markets. The theory has also been
extended to many periods, allowing consideration of industrial as well as trade policy, but only on the
assumption that subsidies can be financed costlessly by non-distortionary taxation, so the marginal
social cost of funds is unity1. In this paper we extend the theory of strategic trade and industrial
policy to allow for divergences between the social valuations of corporate profits and subsidy revenue
foregone. We characterise optimal revenue-constrained trade and industrial policy towards dynamic
oligopolies, prove that total net subsidy payments at the optimum are decreasing in the social cost of
funds, and illustrate the implications in special cases, where investment precedes either Cournot or0165-1765/$ - see front matter D 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1 See Brander (1995); Neary and Leahy (2000) for syntheses and further references. Neary (1994) considers asymmetries
between the private and social cost of funds in one-period models of strategic trade policy..
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applied.2. Strategic trade and industrial policy with and without revenue constraints
In the absence of a government revenue constraint, the setting is the same as in Neary and Leahy
(2000). We consider a market with two firms, denoted ‘‘home’’ and ‘‘foreign’’, which compete over a
finite number T of time periods. In each period t, each firm takes an action, choosing the value of
some variable, at for the home firm and bt for the foreign firm. This specification allows for many
alternative types of oligopolistic interaction: in each period the decision variables might be output,
price, R&D, etc. The home firm seeks to maximise the present value of its profits, p, equal to the
sum of the present values of its gross profits (i.e. sales revenue less total costs) R and its subsidy
income S:
Max
a
pða; b; sÞ ¼ Rða; bÞ þ Sða; b; sÞ; ð1Þ
where a and b are the vectors of the home and foreign firm’s actions, respectively. Both R and S
are twice differentiable functions of own and rival actions; in addition, S depends on a vector of
subsidy rates, one for each period, chosen by the home government, s. In many applications, the
subsidy is directly related to the firm’s decision variable, so the vector of partial derivatives Sa
equals s. An exception is the case of an output subsidy in Bertrand competition, where some
elements of Sa have the opposite sign to those of s.
2 As for the foreign firm, we assume that it is
not assisted by its government, so its decision problem is simply to maximise p*(b, a) =R*(b, a) by
choice of b.
The home government seeks to maximise welfare:
W ða; b; s; dÞ ¼ pða; b; sÞ  dSða; b; sÞ; ð2Þ
where d is the marginal social cost of funds, so the excess of d over one measures the distributional
preference for subsidy revenue over corporate profits. To focus on strategic issues, we assume that
all home output is exported, so welfare does not depend on consumer surplus. We also assume that
the government commits to all future subsidies before firms take any actions. The government’s
problem is, therefore, to choose the vector of subsidies s to maximise Eq. (2), anticipating the game
played between the firms. Formally, we can view the government as solving the first-order
conditions of the two firms for their actions as functions of the subsidies, aˆ(s) and bˆ(s), and
substituting into Eq. (2). Since the number of instruments or subsidies equals the number of targets
or actions chosen by the home firm, and provided (as we assume) the function aˆ(s) is invertible, this
is equivalent to the government’s choosing a. It is as if the government solves aˆ(s) and bˆ(s) for bˆ(a)2 In Bertrand competition, the firm’s decision variable at is its price pt, but its subsidy income in period t, S
t, equals st xt,
where xt, the period-t demand function, depends in general on all current and past actions (prices). Hence, BS
t/Bat = stBxt /
Bpt, which has the opposite sign to xt.
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depends only on a and d:
Wˆ ða; dÞuW ½a; bˆðaÞ; sˆðaÞ; d ¼ RˆðaÞ  ðd  1ÞSˆðaÞ; ð3Þ
where the reduced-form gross profits and subsidy revenue functions Rˆ and Sˆ are defined analogously to
Wˆ: e.g. Rˆ(a)uR[a, bˆ(a)]. Maximising welfare, therefore, leads to the government’s first-order condition:
Wˆa ¼ Rˆa  ðd  1ÞSˆa ¼ 0; ð4Þ
while its second-order condition is that the matrix Wˆaa is negative definite.
When the marginal social cost of funds is unity, only the first term Rˆa on the right-hand side of Eq. (4)
matters. This term can be expressed as the deviation of Sa, the vector of subsidy terms evaluated at an
arbitrary point, from S¯a, the vector of optimal subsidy formulae in the standard case when d equals one
3:
Rˆ Va ¼ R Va þ R Vb bˆa ¼ ðSa  S¯aÞV ð5Þ
The second term on the right-hand side of Eq. (4) can be written:
Sˆ Va ¼ S Va þ S Vb bˆa þ S Vs sˆa: ð6Þ
Substituting into the first-order condition Eq. (4) gives the optimal subsidies in the general case:
S Va ¼ 1d S¯ Va 
d  1
d
ðS Vb bˆa þ S Vs sˆaÞ: ð7Þ
This shows that S¯a, the standard formula for the optimal subsidies, must be modified in two respects.
First, the usual strategic motive for intervention (summarised by S¯a) is diluted, counting for less the
higher is d. Second, there is an additional group of terms, which reflect the deadweight loss of raising
revenue. These terms are likely to contribute to a reduction in the optimal subsidies. (Consider the
one-period case for example. If competition is Cournot, Sa is the optimal subsidy, while Ss and sˆa are
both positive; whereas if competition is Bertrand, then Sa is negatively related to the optimal subsidy,
Ss is positive and sˆa is negative.) There is no general presumption that this must always be so. (Fig. 1
below provides a counter-example in a simple case.) However, we can show that total subsidy
payments are unambiguously related to d:
Proposition 1. Total subsidy payments fall as d rises.
Proof. Totally differentiate the subsidy revenue function Sˆ(a) with respect to d and evaluate at the
optimal a, using the total differential of the government’s first-order condition (4):
dS
dd
¼ Sˆ Va da
dd
¼ Sˆ Va Wˆ1aa Wˆad ¼ Sˆ Va WˆaaSˆa ð8Þ
This is a quadratic form in a matrix which must be negative definite from the government’s second-
order condition. Hence, S and d must be inversely related along the revenue-constrained iso-welfare
locus. 53 See Neary and Leahy (2000), Eqs. (6), (8) and (24).
Fig. 1. Revenue-constrained optimal subsidy locus in R&D-Cournot game.
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choose the level of cost-reducing R&D in the first period and then compete on either output (in Fig. 1)
or price (in Fig. 2)4. In both figures iso-R contours are ellipses centred on point A, the optimum in the
absence of revenue constraints, while iso-S contours are downward-sloping concave loci. Revenue-
constrained optima must lie on the locus, passing through A, of tangency points between these two sets
of contours. A higher marginal social cost of funds (i.e. a rise in d) implies a movement downwards
along this locus from point A. However, as Fig. 1 illustrates, this implies in the Cournot case that the
investment subsidy becomes less negative (though it never attains a positive value). The export subsidy
falls in absolute value, as Proposition 1 requires. The Bertrand case in Fig. 2 is more intuitive. Here,
both subsidies fall in algebraic value as d rises, though the investment subsidy never actually becomes
negative.3. Concluding remarks
In conclusion, we may note the wide applicability of our approach. When d is interpreted as the
marginal social cost of funds, it may exceed unity for a variety of reasons, including the deadweight loss
from financing subsidies by distortionary taxation, pure distributional considerations, or the fact that the4 The cost of R&D k equals ck2 and the cost of production c equals c0 hk. In Fig. 1, the demand function is p= a0X, and
the marginal efficiency of R&D gu h2/c is set at 0.2. In Fig. 2, goods are symmetrically differentiated in demand, the demand
function for home output is x = a ( p p*), where p and p* denote home and foreign prices, respectively, and g equals 0.4. For
very high or very low subsidies, one or other firm is unprofitable.
Fig. 2. Revenue-constrained optimal subsidy locus in R&D-Bertrand game.
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be interpreted in ways which imply a value of d less then one. The first case is where the home firm’s
profits at the unconstrained optimum would be insufficient to induce it to enter the market, and a non-
distorting subsidy to fixed costs is unavailable. Hence the government’s problem is to choose the
optimal policy package to maximise welfare subject to a profit constraint. Forming the Lagrangian, the
government’s problem is to maximise L =W + k(p pm), where pm is the minimum required profit
level. Replacing W by R and dividing by 1+ k, this is equivalent to Eq. (3), except that the coefficient of
the deadweight-loss term is now positive rather than negative: k=(1 d)/d, or d= 1/(1 + k) < 1. A second
case, following Grossman and Helpman (1994) is where the incumbent government seeks to maximise a
political support function, which is a weighted average of welfare and political contributions. Assuming
that the latter equal profits in equilibrium, the political support function is U= aW+(1 a)p, which
(replacing W by R), can again be written in the form of Eq. (3), with d= a< 1. In both these cases,
Proposition 1 implies that total subsidy payments must be greater than in the unconstrained optimum,
and, in Figs. 1 and 2, the optimum lies along the same revenue-constrained loci as before, but above
rather than below point A.Acknowledgements
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